IJAMESC, Vol. 3 No. 01, February 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.61990/ijamesc.v3i1.426 e-ISSN 2986-8645

SHARE OFFERING PERCENTAGE MODERATES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNDERWRITER'S REPUTATION, LEVERAGE AND AUDITOR'S REPUTATION WITH UNDERPRISING

Erly Nur Awalia[1]*, Sugiyanto[2], Endang Ruhiyat[3]
[1.2.3]Master of Accounting Program, Pamulang University, Indonesia
*Corresponding Author:
erlynurawalia@gmail.com

Abstract
Underpricing is formed by a condition where on average the initial share price is lower than the share price in the secondary market. The aim of this research is to test and analyze the influence of underwriter reputation, leverage and auditor reputation on the occurrence of underpricing moderated by the share offering percentage. The type of data used is secondary data from companies conducting an IPO on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The population of this research are companies that experienced underpricing during their initial public offering. The sample for this research was taken using a purposive sampling technique, resulting in sample data of 169 companies. The analytical methods used are statistical analysis, classical assumption testing, hypothesis testing, and moderating regression analysis assisted by the EViews12 program. The results of this study show that underwriter reputation, leverage, auditor reputation have effect on underpricing, the share offering percentage moderate underwriter reputation, leverage, auditor reputation and underpricing.

Keywords: Underpricing, Underwriter Reputation, Leverage, Auditor Reputation, Share Offering Percentage

1. Introduction

The increasingly developing times and increasing economic growth require companies to further develop their business. The expansion that will be carried out by the company will require additional funds from outside parties. There are many sources of funds that companies can get, for example borrowing from banks, issuing bonds or selling stocks. One alternative that can be done is to issue shares to the public for the first time or called an Initial Public Offering (IPO). By conducting an IPO, the company has changed the company's status to a public or public company. In the go-public process, the company first sells its shares in the primary market using the selling price or bid price that has been agreed upon by the company and the underwriter, then the shares will be traded on the secondary market at a price determined by the demand and supply mechanism.

A phenomenon that often appears when a company conducts a go-public or IPO is Underpricing. Underpricing can be defined as a condition when the offering price in the primary market is lower than the stock price when traded in the secondary market. The profit from the difference between the bid price and one price in the secondary market is known as the initial return. Underpriced stock prices can provide high initial returns for investors as soon as the shares are traded in the secondary market (Sugiyanto, 2019).

Agency theory states that there is an information gap between managers as agents and shareholders/owners as principals. This information gap can arise when managers know more about internal information and future company opportunities than principals. If there is no information asymmetry between the issuer and the investor, the offer price will be the same as the market price so that underpricing does not occur.

Table 1. Underpricing Information 2020-2023

IPO Year	Number of Issuers	Underpricing	Underpricing Percentage	Overpricing	Overpricing Percentage	Remain
2020	51	42	82%	9	18%	0
2021	53	44	83%	8	15%	1
2022	56	46	82%	8	14%	2
2023	78	56	72%	20	26%	3
Sum	238	188		45		6

Source: data processed by researchers 2023

Based on the table above, it can be seen that there are 238 companies that have conducted IPOs for the 2020-2023 period. Of the 238 companies that conducted IPOs, there were 188 companies that experienced underpricing and 45 companies that experienced overpricing. The percentage value of underpricing in 2020 was 82%, in 2021 it was 83%, in 2022 it was 82%, and in 2023 it was 72%. This shows that the company's underpricing rate at the time of the IPO is still very high. Thus, this study aims to find out whether underpricing can be affected by the reputation of the underwriter, leverage, auditor reputation and the percentage of stock offerings as moderation

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Signaling Theory

Signaling theory was first coined by Michael Spence in 1973. Spence (1973) stated that by providing a signal, the owner of the information tries to provide information that can be used by the recipient of the information. Instead, the receiving party will behave according to the understanding of the received signal. Brigham and Houston (2018) stated that signal theory is an action taken by company management to show investors how management views the company's prospects. Signals can be in the form of information that explains management's efforts in realizing the public's wishes.

2.2 Agency Theory

Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe an agency relationship as a contract under one or more principals with another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf involving the delegation of some decision-making authority to an agent. If the two parties to the relationship are utility maximizations, then there is another reason to believe that the agency is not always doing what is best in the interests of the main party. Agency theory is based on the creation of an agreement interaction between the two parties where one of them is an agent who agrees to act for the other party, namely the principal (Scott, 2015).

2.3 Underpricing

When the company conducts an initial public offering, the share price is determined based on an agreement between the issuer and the underwriter, while the price that occurs in the secondary market is determined by the existing market mechanism through the power of demand and supply of the shares in the capital market. According to Pahlevi (2014), underpricing is the difference between the closing price on the first day of the secondary market and the offering price. Underpricing is formed on a condition where on average the price of a company that has just gone public, usually the price at the initial public offering is lower than the price of shares in the secondary market. According to Sunariyah (2011) underpricing is the initial stock price below the market price, which in

turn investors will be interested in buying. On average, buying shares in an initial offering can provide a high initial return. Underpricing is common during IPOs. Underpricing for companies that conduct IPOs is considered unprofitable because the proceeds of the sale cannot be managed optimally, but it benefits investors.

2.4 Underwriter Reputation

Underwiriter is an institution that plays a role in supporting the capital market as an underwriter to conduct a public offering on stocks or bonds. The securities underwriter is usually the contractor aimed at the issuer to carry out the bidding decision for the benefit of the issuer to buy the remaining unsold securities based on obligations or non-obligations. The better the underwriter will minimize risk and minimize uncertainty so that underpricing will tend to be avoided (Saifudin and Rahmawati, 2017). The reputation of an underwriter has a great influence on issuers. Its presence can help issuers to increase investor confidence with quality assurance of issuers that have been supervised by underwriters. According to Sunariyah (2011), the success rate of securities issuance in companies is highly dependent on the ability and experience of the underwriters. Even so, the reputation of an underwriter cannot be said to be able to effectively minimize the risk of underpricing because the underwriter only takes advantage of his reputation for personal gain.

2.5 Leverage

Leverage is the ability of a company to pay off its liabilities in the form of short-term and long-term debts that are used for operational purposes or fund investment (Amalia and Wahidati, 2021). High financial leverage will result in stock prices that tend to be underpriced because it will affect the high uncertainty of returns that investors will receive on their investments. Therefore, the higher the company's financial leverage, the greater the underpricing level (Setianingrum and Suwito, 2008).

2.6 Auditor Reputation

The auditor's reputation has a great influence on the credibility of financial statements when a company conducts an IPO. The information contained in the prospectus of the level of trust depends on the auditor conducting the audit. Therefore, the quality of auditors also influences the success of IPOs as shown by the existence of small underpricing (Moizer, 1997). According to Rudyawan (2008), the auditor's reputation is the achievement and public trust held by the auditor on behalf of the auditor. Thus, the reputation of the office such as the size or size of the office used, public trust in the company, and the quality of education provided by the company will greatly affect the public view. The company will utilize a Public Accounting Firm that has high credibility in order to increase the credibility of financial statements in the eyes of financial statement users (Damayanti & Sudarma, 2007).

2.7 Percentage of Stock Offering

Lestari et al. (2015). stated that "the percentage of share offering is the number of shares offered to the public". The number of shares offered by the issuer to the public shows how large of the paid-up capital will be owned by the public. The larger the number of shares offered to the public, the greater the potential liquidity of the shares on the stock exchange (Darmadji and Fakhruddin, 2012: 72). According to Pahlevi (2014), shares offered by issuers to the public show private information owned by a company. The larger

the holdings of the shares held or the smaller the percentage of shares offered to the public, the less uncertainty in the future and the lower the underpricing rate.

2.8 IPO (Initial Public Offering)

The issuance of new shares for the first time can be called an initial public offering. The issuing party is a privately owned company, a family, commonly referred to as the founder of the company. Companies that have not/are not going public are called private companies, while companies that are go-public are called public companies. After conducting an initial share offering, the company can still issue shares for business expansion. Companies have different goals in carrying out go-public. In general, the following are the company's goals in going public: improving the capital structure, increasing production capacity, expanding marketing, expanding business relationships, and improving the quality of management (Samsul, 2015).

2.9 Previous Research and Hypothesis Development



Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Ardhiani (2020) stated that the reputation of underwriters has a significant negative influence on IPO underpricing. Rimmah (2021) stated that financial leverage has a positive effect on underpricing. Ivanna (2020) stated that auditor reputation has a positive effect on underpricing. *H1: It is suspected that the reputation of the underwriter, leverage, and the reputation of the auditor simultaneously affect the underpricing.*

According to Yuliani (2019) in his research stated that the reputation of underwriters has a significant negative effect on underpricing. Another similar research, namely Ivanna (2020), stated that the reputation of underwriters has a negative effect on underpricing, because the better the underwriter used by the company, the lower the level of underpricing of stocks. Diah (2021) also stated that the reputation of underwriters has a negative effect on IPO underpricing. *H2: It is suspected that the reputation of the underwriter has an effect on the underpricing of stocks.*

Yuliani (2019) in his research stated that laverage does not have a significant influence on underpricing. Research conducted by Ardhiani (2020) shows that laverage has a

significant positive effect on underpricing, this shows that a company's financial information will have an impact on the size or size of the underpricing of IPO shares. *H3: It is suspected that leverage has an effect on the underpricing of stocks.*

Ivanna (2020) said that the auditor's reputation has a positive effect on stock underpricing, this is because investors do not consider the auditor's reputation as a signal in determining investments. Fazar's latest research (2023) states different results that auditor reputation actually has a negative effect on underpricing. *H4: It is suspected that the auditor's reputation can affect the underpricing of stocks.*

Ivana (2020) stated that the percentage of stock offerings has an insignificant influence on the level of stock underpricing. Larasati, et al. (2023), in their research stated that the percentage of stock offerings has an insignificant negative influence on underpricing. *H5: It is suspected that the percentage of stock offerings moderates the relationship between the underwriter's reputation and the level of underpricing of stocks.*

Rendy (2023) stated that the percentage of stock offerings has a significant positive effect on underpricing. Fazar (2023) found that laverage (DER) had a significant negative effect on underpricing in IPO companies in 2019-2022. *H6: It is suspected that the percentage of stock offerings moderates the relationship between leverage and the level of underpricing of stocks.*

Herbanu (2017) stated that the percentage of stock offerings has a significant positive effect on stock underpricing. *H7: It is suspected that the percentage of stock offerings moderates the relationship between the auditor's reputation and the level of stock underpricing*

3. Methods

3.1 Research Population and Sample

The population of this study is companies that conduct initial public offerings on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and experience underpricing. The sampling technique used in this study is the purposive sampling technique. The purposive sampling technique is a technique that takes samples according to certain criteria that have been set by the researcher. This study uses the Microsoft Excel program to manage and calculate the overall data, and uses the EViews 12 program to test the research data.

Table 2. Sample Determination

No.	Criterion	Violation of Criteria	Accumulation
1.	Companies that conduct Initial Public Offerings in 2020-2023.		238
2.	Companies that are overpriced and the stock price remains fixed at the time of the Initial Public Offering.	(47)	191
3.	Companies engaged in the financial sector.	(7)	184
4.	Companies that publish financial statements are expressed in dollars.	(9)	175
5.	Companies that do not/have not published audited financial statements.	(5)	170
6.	The company has negative equity one year before conducting the Initial Public Offering.	(1)	169
Number of observation data of a sample of companies that conducted IPOs		169	

Source: data processed by researchers 2024

3.2 Dependent Variables

The underpricing phenomenon is measured using the initial return formula, which is by calculating the difference between the closing price of shares in the secondary market on the first day and the price at the time of the public offering, then divided by the public offering price.

$$UP = \frac{(Closing\ Price - offering\ price)\ X\ 100\%}{Offering\ price}$$

Information:
UP/Underpricing = the initial stock price is below the market price.
Closing Price = the price that appears when the exchange closes.
Offering Price = the share price set by the investment bank during the IPO process.

3.3 Independent Variables

3.3.1 Underwriter Reputation

Indonesia does not have a definite stipulation or indicator regarding reputable underwriters, let alone formal institutions that rank the reputation of underwriters. Therefore, one way that can be done to measure the reputation of underwiters is to use the 10 most active brokerage in total frequency indicator in IDX monthly statistics, or the 10 most active brokers in terms of trading frequency in IDX monthly statistics.

Table 3. Top 10 Underwriters

2020	2021
Mirae Asset Sekuritas Indonesia	Mirae Asset Sekuritas Indonesia (YP)
Indo Premier Sekuritas	Mandiri Sekuritas (CC)
Mandiri Sekuritas	Indo Premier Sekuritas (PD)
MNC Sekuritas	UBS Sekuritas Indonesia (AK)
BNI Sekuritas	CGS-CIMB Sekuritas Indonesia (YU)
Philip Sekuritas Indonesia	Maybank Kim Eng Sekuritas Indonesia (ZP)
RHB Sekuritas Indonesia	J.P Morgan Sekuritas Indonesia (BK)
Maybank Kim Eng Sekuritas	Credit Suisse Sekuritas Indonesia (CS)
CGS-CIMB Sekuritas Indonesia	Semesta Indovest Sekuritas (MD)
10. Credit Suisse Sekuritas Indonesia	CSLA Sekuritas Indonesia (KZ)
2022	2023
PT Mirae Asset Indonesia (YP)	BRI Danareksa Sekuritas (BRIDS)
PT Indopremier Sekuritas (PD)	Indo Premier Sekuritas
PT KB Valbury Sekuritas (CP)	Mirae Securities Asset
PT Mandiri Sekuritas (CC)	BNI Sekuritas
PT Ajaib Sekuritas Asia (XC)	Mandiri Sekuritas
PT Korea Investment and Sekuritas Indonesia (BQ)	Sinarmas Sekuritas
PT Sucor Sekuritas (AZ)	Philip Sekuritas Indonesia
PT UBS Sekuritas Indonesia (AK)	Trimegah Sekuritas
PT Stockbit Sekuritas Digital (XL)	MNC Sekuritas
PT Semesta Indovest Sekuritas (MG)	BCA Sekuritas

Source: finansialku.com

For underwriters who are in the top 10 in monthly trading frequency, they will be given a value of 1. Conversely, underwriters who are not in the top 10 will be given a score or a score of 0.

3.3.2 Leverage

The debt-to-equity ratio is a ratio that measures the extent to which the amount of debt can be covered by its own capital (Darmadji and Fakhrudin, 2012). DER is measured as follows:

$$DER = \frac{\text{total utang}}{\text{ekuitas}}$$

Information:
DER = the company's ability to pay debts.
Total Debt = amount of debt and other obligations.
Equity = the rights of the owner of the company's assets after deducting liabilities in the balance sheet.

3.3.3 Auditor Reputation

The size of the Public Accounting Firm is generally used as a proxy to show the quality of the audit. The auditor's reputation is measured by the size of the Public Accounting Firm (KAP) using a dummy variable. A large Public Accounting Firm is an accounting firm that is included in the big four accounting firms, and a small Public Accounting Firm is an accounting firm that is not included in the big four accounting firm.

Table 4. Big Four

No.	Big Four	HOOD
1.	Price Powerhouse-Coopers (PwC)	Tanudiredja, Wibisana, Rintis and Partners
2.	Ernest & Young Global Limited (EY)	Purwantono, Suherman and Surja
3.	Deloitte Touche & Tohmatsu	Hermawan Juniarto & Partners
4.	Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG)	Siddharta Widjaja and Colleagues

Source: data from glints.com

If the KAP is included in the category of The Big Four Auditors, it will be given code 1, while if it is not included in the category of The Big Four Auditors, it will be given code 0. (Santosa and Wedari, 2007)

3.4 Moderation Variables

The percentage of shares offered is the number of shares offered by the company to the public, especially to investors, in percentage units. The percentage of the share offering is measured as follows

$$PPS = \frac{\text{jumlah saham yang ditawarkan}}{\text{jumlah saham milik perusahaan}} x\ 100\%$$

Information:
PPS = Percentage of Stock Offering

3.5 Data Analysis Methods

Statistical data processing has a very important role as research because from the results of data processing we will get research conclusions. Data processing techniques include data calculations, analysis of research models. Before making conclusions in a study, analysis of data must be carried out so that the results of the research are accurate. Therefore, this study was carried out using a statistical method using multiple linear regression model analysis processed with the help of the EViews 12 program. The stages or steps are to conduct a quantitative analysis consisting of Descriptive Analysis, Classical Assumption Test, Hypothesis Test, and Moderating Regression Analysis.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Results of Descriptive Analysis

Table 5. Results of Descriptive Analysis

	UP	PPS	RU	DER	RA	RUPPS	DERPPS	RAPPS
Mean	0,333337	0,207781	0,272189	0,640633	0,118343	0,050586	0,123231	0,014521
Median	0,250000	0,200000	0,000000	0,418000	0,000000	0,000000	0,080000	0,000000
Maximum	2,740000	0,553000	1,000000	4,602000	1,000000	0,300000	1,151000	0,250000
Minimum	0,007000	0,011000	0,000000	0,017000	0,000000	0,000000	0,002000	0,000000
Std. Dev.	0,428082	0,075092	0,446410	0,699426	0,323974	0,089775	0,138876	0,046298
Observation	169	169	169	169	169	169	169	169

Source: data processed with EViews12 2024

Table 5 shows the results of descriptive statistics with a sample number of 169 companies that conducted IPOs with the following results:

1) The results show that the minimum value of the underpricing variable is 0.007000, while the maximum value is 2.740000, with a mean value of 0.333337, with a standard deviation value of 0.428082, so that the results of descriptive analysis show a smaller mean value compared to the standard deviation value, indicating that the distribution of the data tends to be inclined towards a smaller value, which suggests that The data tends to have small values overall and has significant variation around the mean.
2) The results show that the minimum value of the percentage of shares as a moderation variable is 0.011000, while the maximum value is 0.553000, with a mean value of 0.207781 and a standard value of 0.075092, so that the results of descriptive analysis show a larger mean value compared to the standard deviation value, showing that the distribution of the data tends to be inclined towards a larger value, This suggests that the data tend to have large overall values and have significant variation around the mean.
3) The results show that the minimum value of the underwriter reputation variable is 0.000000, while the maximum value is 1.000000, with a mean value of 0.272189 and a standard deviation value of 0.446410, so that the results of descriptive analysis show a smaller mean value compared to the standard deviation value, indicating that the distribution of the data tends to be inclined towards a smaller value, which suggests that The data tends to have small values overall and has significant variation around the mean.
4) The results show that the minimum value of the leverage variable is 0.017000, while the maximum value is 4.602000, with a mean value of 0.640633 and a standard value of 0.699426, so that the results of descriptive analysis show a smaller mean value compared to the standard deviation value, showing that the distribution of the data tends to be inclined towards a smaller value, this hinting that the data tends to have small values overall and have significant variation around the mean.
5) The results show that the minimum value of the auditor's reputation variable is 0.000000, while the maximum value is 1.000000 with a mean value of 0.118343 and a standard value of 0.323974, so that the results of descriptive analysis show a larger mean value compared to the standard deviation value, showing that the distribution of the data tends to be inclined towards a larger value, this suggests that the data tends to have large values overall and has significant variation around the mean.
6) The results showed that the minimum value of the underwriter reputation variable was moderated by the percentage per share, which was 0.000000, while the maximum

value was 0.300000 with a mean value of 0.050586, and a standard value of 0.089775, so that the results of the descriptive analysis showed an average value (mean) is smaller than the standard deviation value, indicating that the distribution of the data tends to be skewed towards smaller values, suggesting that the data tend to have small values overall and have significant variation around the mean.

7) The results show that the minimum value of the leverage variable is moderated by the percentage per share, which is 0.002000, while the maximum value is 1.151000 with a mean value of 0.123231, and a standard value of 0.138876, so that the results of descriptive analysis show an average value (mean) is smaller than the standard deviation value, indicating that the distribution of the data tends to be skewed towards smaller values, suggesting that the data tend to have small values overall and have significant variation around the mean.
8) The results showed that the minimum value of the auditor's reputation variable was moderated by the percentage per share, which was 0.000000, while the maximum value was 0.250000 with a mean value of 0.014521, and a standard value of 0.046298, so that the results of the descriptive analysis showed an average value (mean) is smaller than the standard deviation value, indicating that the distribution of the data tends to be skewed towards smaller values, suggesting that the data tend to have small values overall and have significant variation around the mean.

4.2 Results of the Classic Assumption Test

4.2.1 Normality Test

The normal distributed decision of residual or not is simple by comparing the probability value of JB (Jarque-Bera) calculated with an alpha level of 0.05 (5%). If the probability of JB is greater than 0.05, it can be concluded that the residual is normally distributed and vice versa, if the value is smaller, there is not enough evidence to state that the residual is normally distributed (Ghozali, 2016:161).



Source: data processed by EViews12 2024

Figure 2. Normality Test Results

The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test showed that the probability value was 0.62 > 0.05, so the data was normally distributed.

4.2.2 Multicollinearity Test

The multicollinearity test aims to detect correlations between independent variables. In this study, the symptoms of multicollinearity were identified through the correlation values between variables. Based on Ghozali (2018:71), a correlation above 0.8 between CSR and GCG variables indicates multicollinearity. The results of the multicollinearity test are shown in the following table:

Table 6. Multicollinearity Test Results

Variable	Coefficient Variance	Uncentered VIF	Centered VIF
C	0,000145	1,574037	NA
RU	0,000527	1,559217	1,134815
DER	7,36E-06	1,103140	1,022386
RA	0,001049	1,215482	1,086023

Source: data processed by EViews12 2024

Based on the results of the Multicollinearity Test obtained on the centered variance inflation factors (VIF) in the independent variables of underwriter reputation (1.134815), leverage (1.022386), and auditor reputation (1.086023), it can be concluded that the centered VIF value of the independent variable is less than 10, indicating the absence of multicollinearity or can be said to have passed the multiconformity test

4.2.3 Heteroscedacity Test

According to the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test method, it is assumed that the heteroscedasticity detection method (σ_i^2) is a positive function of independent variables. The following are the results of the heteroscedasticity test:

Table 7. Heteroscedasticity Test Results

Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfey Null hyphothesis: Homokedasticity			
Obs *R-squared	6,663195	Prob. Just Square(6)	0,9187

Source: data processed by researchers with EViews 2024

Based on the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test, it can be seen that the prob value. Chi-square has a value of 0.9187 > 0.05, so it can be concluded that residual is randomly distributed, meaning that no heteroscedasticity occurs or passes the heteroscenidity test.

4.2.4 Autocorrelation Test

The autocorrelation test aims to test whether there is a relationship between errors in the current year period and the previous year in the linear regression model (Ghozali, 2016: 131). The rule in this test is that if the Durbin-Watson (DW) value is between the upper bound (du) and (4-du), then the autocorrelation coefficient is equal to 0, which means there is no autocorrelation.

Table 8. Autocorrelation Test Results

Durbin-Watson stat	1,975420

Source: data processed by researchers with EViews 2024

Autocorrelation testing was carried out using the Durbin Watson (DW) method and the criteria for no autocorrelation were if dL < dU < DW < 4-dU < 4-dL. Judging from the significance of 5% of the independent variable (k) = 3 and the number of samples (n) = 169, it is obtained that the value of dL = 1.7124, with a value of 4 - dL = 2.2876 and a value of Du 1.7846, a value of 4 - Du = 2.2154. From the output presented in table 4.6, the DW (Durbin-Watson) value is 1.280171, and the criteria for the value that are not autocorrelated are 1.7124 < 1.7846 < 1.975420 < 2.2154 < 2.2876. So that the results obtained are that there is no autocorrelation or passing the autocorrelation test.

4.3 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Before Moderation

Table 9. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Before Moderation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0,044921	0,119690	0,375315	0,0111
RU	0,055086	0,075541	0,729231	0,0467
DER	0,079198	0,47216	1,677343	0,0380
RA	0,056281	0,112240	0,501434	0,0167

Source: data processed by EViews12

Based on the table above, the regression equation of cross section data can be arranged as follows:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2X2 + \beta 3X3$$

$$UP = 0.32244 - 0.067366\ RU + 0.061244\ DER - 0.167353\ RA$$

Decision-making criteria (Hamid et al., 2020:66)

1) The value of the constant coefficient is 0.044921 or 4.49%, this can be interpreted that without the variables of underwriter reputation (X1), leverage (X2), auditor reputation (X3), it will increase by 4.49%
2) The value of the beta coefficient of the underwriter reputation variable (X1) is 0.055086 or 5.50%, if the value of other variables of the constant and variable X1 increases by 1%, then the underpricing variable (Y) increases by 5.50%.
3) The value of the beta coefficient of the leverage variable (X2) is 0.079198 or 7.91%, if the value of other variables of the constant and variable X2 increases by 1%, then the underpricing variable (Y) increases by 7.91%.
4) The value of the beta coefficient of the auditor reputation variable (X1) is 0.056281 or 5.62%, if the value of other variables of constant and variable X1 increases by 1%, then the underpricing variable (Y) increases by 5.62%.

4.4 Hypothesis Test Results

4.4.1 Results of Simultaneous Significance Test (Statistical Test F)

In order to see if there is an influence of the independent variable on the bound variable, a simultaneous test can be carried out by looking at the significance produced. If the significance level is less than 0.05, then it can be said that all independent variables affect the bound variable or it can be interpreted that the model is feasible to use, if the significance level is greater than 0.05, it can be interpreted that the independent variable has no influence on the bound variable.

Table 10. Test Result F

F-statistic	3,054145	Durbin-Watson stat	1,251560
Prob (F-statistic)	0,011028		

Source: data processed by EViews12

From the data in the table above, it can be seen that the F value is calculated as 3.054145 > the F table is 2.658079, and the probability value of F-statistic < a significance value of 5% (0.05) which is 0.011028 < 0.05. So H0 was rejected and Ha was accepted. This means that it can be concluded in this study that the variables (x) underwrite reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation have a significant effect simultaneously (simultaneously) on the variable (y) underpricing.

4.4.2 Results of the Partial Significance Test (t-Test)

The statistical t test aims to find out how far the influence of one independent variable individually in explaining the variation of dependent variables. The hypothesis equation

is that if the resulting significant value < 0.05, there is a significant influence between independent variables and dependent variables. The t-test is used to test the hypothesis, namely the influence of underwriter's reputation on underpricing, the effect of leverage on underpricing, the auditor's reputation on underpricing, the influence of the percentage of legitimate offers moderating the underwriter' s reputation on underpricing, the effect of the percentage of legitimate offers moderating on leverage on underpricing, and the effect of the percentage of legitimate bids moderates the auditor's reputation against underpricing.

Table 11. Test Results t

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0,044921	0,119690	0,375315	0,0111
RU	0,055086	0,075541	0,729231	0,0467
DER	0,079198	0,047216	1,677343	0,0380
RA	0,056281	0,112240	0,501434	0,0167
PPS	1,248131	0,478726	2,607194	0,0100

Source: data processed by EViews12

The influence of independent variables on partial dependent variables is as follows:

1) The underwriter reputation variable has a significant effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the t-statistical value of 0.729231 which is smaller than the t-table 1.653920 in the RU table with a smaller probability of 0.0467 from the α value of 0.05.
2) The leverage variable has a significant effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the t-statistical value of 1.677343 which is greater than the t-table 1.653920 in the DER probability table which is smaller than the α value of 0.05.
3) The auditor's reputation variable has a significant effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the t-statistical value of 0.501434 which is smaller than the t-table 1.653920 in the RA probability table which is smaller by 0.0167 from the α value of 0.05.
4) The variable of the percentage of stock offering has a significant effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the t-statistical value of 2.607194 which is greater than the t table 1.653920 in the PPS probability table which is smaller by 0.0100 than the α value of 0.05.
5)

4.4.3 Results of the Determination Coefficient Test (R2 Test)

Coefficient Determination aims to find out how much the independent variable can explain the bound variable. If the value R2 = 1, it means that the Y variable as a whole can be explained by the X variables. However, if the R2 = 0 value, it means that the Y variable cannot be explained at all by the X variables.

Table 12. R2 Test Results

Squared	0.069327
Adjusted R-squared	0.046628

Source: data processed by EViews12

The results of the determination coefficient test of adjusted R Square of 0.046628 concluded that the contribution of the influence of independent variables on dependent variables simultaneously was 4.66%. This means that the magnitude of underpricing can be explained by the variables of underwriter reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation studied, while the remaining 95.34% is explained by other variables outside the study.

4.5 Results of Moderate Regression Analysis (MRA)

Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) is used for panel data regression models involving moderation variables, where the regression equation includes multiplication interactions between two or more independent variables. In this study, the moderation variable is Audit Quality, which moderates the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility, and Good Corporate Governance on Corporate Value.

The hypothesis decision in the Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) test is as follows: if the Probability value > α 0.05, then H0 is rejected, which means that Audit Quality cannot moderate the influence of independent variables on dependent variables. Conversely, if the Probability value < α 0.05, then H0 is accepted, indicating that Audit Quality can moderate the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

Table 13. Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) Test

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0,228088	0,014273	15,98008	0,000
RU	-0,136019	0,075355	1,805055	0,0354
DER	0,033887	0,033019	1,026289	0,0239
RA	0,052477	0,076446	0,686455	0,0493
RUPPS	0,730955	0,369252	1,979556	0,0496
DERPPS	0,063550	0,164786	0,385654	0,0029
RAPPS	0,046754	0,476095	0,098203	0,0190

Source: data processed by researchers, 2024

The results of the table above obtained the regression equation in this study are as follows:

$$Y= \alpha + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2X2 + \beta 3X3 + \beta 4Z + \beta 5X1*Z + \beta 6X2*Z + \beta 7X3*Z + e$$

$$UP = 0.228088 - 0.136019 + 0.033887 + 0.052477 + 0.730955 + 0.063550 + 0.046754 + e$$

1) Based on the output results of the moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the constant value of 0.228088 shows that if the independent variable is 0, it will experience an increase in underpricing of 0.228088.
2) Based on the output results of the moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the regression coefficient value for underwriter reputation was -0.136019. This means that if there is a change in 1 unit of underwriter reputation, it will experience a decrease in underpricing of -0.136019.
3) Based on the output results of the moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the regression coefficient value for leverage is 0.033887, which means that if there is a change of 1 unit of leverage, there will be an increase in underpricing of 0.033887.
4) Based on the output results of the moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the regression coefficient value for auditor reputation of 0.052477 means that if there is a change in 1 unit of auditor reputation, it will experience an increase in underpricing of 0.052477.
5) Based on the output results of this moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the probability value showed a figure of 0.0496 which was smaller than the significance value of 0.05, which means that the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the relationship between the reputation of the underwriter and the underpricing. Then, the result of the interaction of underwriter reputation and the percentage of stock offerings has a coefficient value of 0.730955, which means that the percentage of stock offerings moderates and weakens the relationship between the

reputation of the underwriter and underpricing. This shows that every 1 increase in the underwriter's reputation unit on the underwriter's reputation interaction and the percentage of stock offerings will decrease the underpricing by 0.730955.

6) Based on the output results of this moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the probability value results showed a number of 0.0029 which was smaller than the significance of 0.05, meaning that the percentage of stock offerings could moderate the leverage relationship with underpricing. Then, the result of the interaction of leverage and the percentage of stock offering has a coefficient value of 0.063550, which means that the percentage of stock offering moderates and strengthens the relationship between leverage and underpricing. This shows that every 1 increase in leverage unit on the interaction of leverage and the share offering percentage will increase the underpricing by 0.063550.
7) Based on the output results of this moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the probability value showed a figure of 0.0190 which was greater than the significance value of 0.05 which means that the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the relationship between auditor reputation and underpricing. Then, the result of the interaction of leverage and the percentage of stock offering has a coefficient value of 0.046754, which means that the percentage of stock offering moderates and strengthens the relationship between leverage and underpricing. This shows that every 1 increase in leverage units on the interaction of leverage and stock offering percentage will increase the underpricing by 0.046754.

Table 14. Test F and R after Moderation Result

R-Squared	0,926209
Adjusted R-squared	2,271678
F-Statistic	119,2424
Prob(F-statistic)	0,000000

Source: data processed by researchers, 2024

From the data of table 4.11 above, it can be seen that the F value is calculated as 119.2424 > the F table is 2.658079, and the probability value of F-statistic < a significance value of 5% (0.05) which is 0.000000 < 0.05. So H0 was rejected and Ha was accepted. This means that it can be concluded in this study that the variables (x) underwriter reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation have a significant effect simultaneously (simultaneously) on the (y) underpricing variable.

Table 4.14 shows that the test results of the adjusted R Square determination coefficient are 0.918442, it is concluded that the contribution of the influence of moderated independent variables on dependent variables simultaneously is 91.84%. This means that the amount of underpricing can be explained by the percentage of stock offerings that moderate the variables of underwriter reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation studied, while the remaining 8.16% is explained by other variables outside the study.

4.6 Discussion of Research Results

1) The Influence of Underwriter's Reputation, Leverage, and Auditor's Reputation on Underpricing. From the data of table 4.6, it can be seen that the F value is calculated as 3.054145 > the F table is 2.658079, and the probability value of F-statistic < a significance value of 5% (0.05) which is 0.011028 < 0.05. So H0 was rejected and Ha was accepted. It can be concluded in this study that the independent variables have a significant effect simultaneously (simultaneously) on the dependent variables. This

means that the dependent underpricing variable can be affected jointly by the independent variables of underwriter reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation. The results of this study are in line with previous research, namely Ardhiani (2020) stated that the reputation of underwriters has a significant negative influence on IPO underpricing. Rimmah (2021) stated that financial leverage has a positive effect on underpricing. Ivanna (2020) stated that auditor reputation has a positive effect on underpricing. The three studies agreed that the reputation of underwriters, leverage, and auidtor reputation have an influence on underpricing with a certain portion having a positive and negative effect. However, the study corroborates the research that researchers are doing, stating that these three variables are proven to have an influence on underpricing. Underpricing is closely related to signal theory, when an issuer signals through information it can change the decision of the recipient of the information. The information disclosure carried out by this issuer aims to minimize the importance of information between potential investors and management. These signals can be in the form of financial leverage reports, auditor reputation, underwriter reputation so that potential investors can read the company's condition. Companies recruit agents/underwriters to help delegate decision-making, a process that can be referred to as the implementation of agency theory.

2) The Influence of Underwriter's Reputation on Underpricing. Based on the results of the hypothesis test that the underwriter reputation variable (X1) has an effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the value in the RU probability table which is smaller at 0.0467 than the α value of 0.05. Thus, the second hypothesis, namely H2, is accepted, the reputation of the underwriter has a significant effect on underpricing. This means that the reputation of the underwriter contracted by the company can affect the occurrence of stock underpricing during the IPO. The results of this study are supported by previous research, Yuliani (2019), Ivanna (2020), and Diah (2021) stated that the reputation of underwriters has a significant effect on underpricing, because the better the underwriter used by the company, the lower the level of underpricing of shares. It is the same with the findings in the study that the reputation of the underwriter has an influence, so when it is associated with the signal theory that explains that the signal given by the underwriter to the potential investor determines the attitude of the potential investor to invest in a company, it means that the underwriter has a role as a party that influences the potential investor. This is in accordance with the signal theory, underwriters are an important factor during the process of buying and selling shares in the capital market, especially during IPOs. The better the underwriter, the less risk of underpricing, in this study is in line with the theory that the reputation of the underwriter affects the occurrence of underpricing. According to Sunariyah (2011), the success rate of securities issuance in a company is highly dependent on the ability and experience of the underwriter, but the reputation of the underwriter cannot effectively minimize the risk of underpricing because the underwriter only cares about the personal profit of the reputation. Underwriters allow attracting potential investors with positive signals and allow influencing potential investors to invest in the company that gives them contracts, but the underwriter cannot determine the best bid price for the company. In the agency theory in this underpricing case , the underwriter is the party who serves as an agent and the issuer is the party that plays the role of principal. This study proves that the agency theory is still valid today. The issuer still needs other parties to be contracted in accordance with the agreement of both parties. Cooperation with third

parties will certainly continue as well as other economic demands. Third parties are needed to attract potential investors by providing good signals (signalling theory) so that the investment process expected by issuers occurs. However, the cooperation agreement process does not guarantee the reduction of underpranking risks, but there is a good signal from the underwriter that at least it can attract potential investors to invest in the company.

3) Leverage Effect on Underpricing. Based on table 4.7, the t-value of the leverage variable (X2) has an effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the value in the DER probability table which is smaller than the α value of 0.05. So the H3 hypothesis is accepted, leverage has a significant effect on underpricing. This research is in accordance with Ardhiani's (2020) research, laverage has a significant positive effect on underpricing, this shows that a company's financial information will have an impact on the size or size of the underpricing of IPO shares. Issuers that have a high debt ratio have the possibility of funding from stock IPO proceeds to pay off debt rather than using the funds as capital for business expansion, thereby reducing investor confidence to invest in companies with a large debt ratio. The company's condition is said to be financially healthy when the debt ratio is not too far from the company's assets. Companies that do not have debt actually raise doubts among potential investors because it is related to taxes and business relationships. The results of this study show that the interest of potential investors to invest their capital is influenced by the company's financial statements. According to Kim, et al,. (2001), theoretically, financial leverage indicates the risk of a company and conditions of uncertainty. The amount of the company's financial leverage will indicate the greater financial risk or risk of the company's failure to repay its loans so that it can affect the determination of a reasonable share price at the time of the IPO. Leverage in signal theory is that the higher the company's debt, the higher the risk borne by the company, so it becomes a bad signal for potential investors because the company's profitability is considered less profitable. Information in the form of debt ratios or assets disseminated by the management will be used as a consideration in making decisions, in accordance with signal theory.
4) The Effect of Auditor Reputation on Underpricing. Based on table 4.7, the t-value of the auditor's reputation variable (X3) has an effect on underpricing, this can be seen from the value in the RA probability table which is smaller at 0.0167 than the α value of 0.05. Answering the H4 hypothesis, the auditor's reputation has a significant effect on underpricing. The auditor's reputation affects the credibility of financial statements when a company goes public. A highly reputable auditor can be used as a sign or indication of the quality of the issuer's company. Issuers that use good auditor services are considered to reduce uncertainty in the future. However, a reputable auditor cannot guarantee a low risk of underpricing. This research is in line with research conducted by Ivanna (2020), stating that auditor reputation has a positive effect on stock underpricing, this is because investors do not consider auditor reputation as a signal in determining investment. Fazar's latest research (2023) actually states a different result, namely that auditor reputation has no effect on underpricing. This can happen due to a lack of investor confidence in the Big Four KAP. In fact, the sample of companies in this study used more KAP that were not included in the Big Four than those who used the Big Four KAP services. The lack of influence of auditor reputation on underpricing is also due to the purpose and interest of investors in placing their funds during the first capital market. According to Suhardjo (2015), auditors as

auditors of financial statements have a big and important role for prospective companies to determine whether or not the company can be listed on the market. The size of the Public Accounting Firm is generally used as a proxy to show the quality of the audit. The large Public Accounting Firms (KAP) are accounting firms that are included in the big four accounting firms, namely Price Powerhouse-Coopers (PwC), Ernest & Young Global Limited (EY), Deloitte Touche & Tohmatsu, and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). Agency theory is the basis for this activity, agents receive audit services from reputable KAP in evaluating the results of financial statements so that there is no information asymmetry with the principal. Agency theory shows the importance of separating functions between company management and the relationship between owners and managers. The separation of functions aims to create efficiency and effectiveness in managing the company by hiring professionals.

5) Percentage of Stock Offerings Moderate Underwriter's Reputation Relationship with Underpricing. Based on table 4.9 of the output results of the moderation regression analysis table, it can be obtained that the results of the probability value show a number of 0.0496 which is smaller than the significance value of 0.05, which means that the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the relationship between the reputation of the underwriter and the underpricing. Thus, the H5 hypothesis is answered that the percentage of stock offerings moderates the relationship between the reputation of the underwriter and the underpricing. This research is not in line with the research of Ardhiani & Kerry (2020) which states that the percentage of stock offerings does not have a significant effect on IPO underpricing, this is because investors are not oriented to the number of shares offered or not but to the value of the IPO shares. The stock price at the time of the IPO will determine the amount of profit that will be obtained, the lower the price at the time of the IPO, the higher the enthusiasm of investors in the IPO stock which will have an influence on the high underpricing. Lestari et al. (2015). stated that "the percentage of share offering is the number of shares offered to the public". The number of shares offered by the issuer to the public shows how large of the paid-up capital will be owned by the public. The more percentage of shares offered will add to the uncertainty in the future. Therefore, the underwriter will set the initial stock price lower than it should be. So that the larger the percentage of shares offered, the higher the underpricing rate. This research is in line with signal theory, which says that the percentage of stock offerings can be a signal for potential investors to consider the decision to invest their funds. As has been explained, the more shares are realized by the company's management, it will change the perspective of potential investors to consider how the company's condition will be in the future. Potential investors will read as well as possible the signals spread by the company's management to minimize the risk of loss.
6) Stock Offerings Moderate Leverage Relationship with Underpricing. Based on the output results of this moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the probability value results showed a number of 0.0026 which is smaller than the significance of 0.05, meaning that the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the leverage relationship with underpricing. However, the output results of the moderation regression analysis table obtained a regression coefficient value for leverage and the percentage of stock offerings had a coefficient value of 0.063550, which means that the percentage of stock offerings moderated and strengthened the relationship between leverage and underpricing. So the H6 hypothesis is accepted, the

percentage of stocks can moderate the relationship of leverage with underpricing. The results of this study are in line with Herbanu (2017) stating that the percentage of stock offerings has a significant positive effect on stock underpricing. Companies that lack capital to expand their business activities can choose the alternative of going public to raise funds, meaning that by offering more shares, they can raise a lot of capital. According to Pahlevi (2014), shares offered by issuers to the public show private information owned by a company. The larger the percentage of stock offerings to the public, the greater the level of uncertainty in the future. Companies that lack capital to expand their business activities can choose the alternative of going public to raise funds, meaning that by offering more shares can allow a lot of capital to be collected. This research proves that in signal theory, investors consider the percentage of stock offerings as a sign to determine investment decisions. The large number of shares issued by the company will be a consideration for potential investors, especially if the company issues a lot of shares with good financial leverage conditions. Investors will gladly invest their capital. This is associated with the signaling theory which says that the more percentage of IPO shares, the greater the risk to the issuer. With the company offering few shares to the public will signal that the company is holding a lot of information. However, even though the company does not complete the information to be disseminated to potential investors, the most important thing is the offer price offered by the issuer. In the explanation of signal theory, the emphasis on supply prices aims to provide a quality signal from the company, because only quality companies are considered able to cover losses due to the underpricing phenomenon with the realization of long-term performance.

7) Stock Offerings Moderate the Relationship Between Auditor Reputation and Underpricing. Based on the output results of this moderation regression analysis table, it was obtained that the output results of this moderation regression analysis table showed that the probability value showed a figure of 0.0190 which was smaller than the significance value of 0.05 which means that the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the relationship between auditor reputation and underpricing. Then, the result of the interaction of leverage and the percentage of stock offering has a coefficient value of 0.046754. So, the H7 hypothesis is accepted, the percentage of stock offerings can moderate the relationship between auditor reputation and underpricing. This research is in line with research conducted by Ivana (2020). stated that the percentage of stock offerings has an insignificant influence on the level of stock underpricing. This is because the number of shares offered is not able to explain the company's performance in the future. So that even if the company uses the services of auditors from the big 4 KAP, it will not always affect the behavior of potential investors. According to Rudyawan (2008), the auditor's reputation is the achievement and public trust held by the auditor on behalf of the auditor. Thus, the reputation of the office such as the size or size of the office used, public trust in the company, and the quality of education provided by the company will greatly affect the public view. The auditor's reputation has a great influence on the credibility of financial statements when a company conducts an IPO. In agency theory, auditors act as agents who are trusted to do certain work, in this case as financial report makers which will then be used as a signal to attract the attention of potential investors so that they are expected to make decisions to invest capital. However, the auditor's reputation does not have the power to minimize the risk of underpricing. The auditor is only in charge of making financial statements of a company, after the work is completed, the auditor

does not have the authority to determine how many shares will be sold along with the price.

5. Conclusion

It is statistically proven that the reputation of underwriters, leverage, and auditor reputation have a simultaneous influence on the level of underpricing. Individually, the reputation of an underwriter significantly affects underpricing, as supported by agency theory, where high-quality underwriting services serve as a positive signal to investors. Financial leverage, measured by the Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER), also significantly impacts underpricing, as it is influenced by various market policies, including interest rates and investor purchasing power. Additionally, auditor reputation plays a crucial role in underpricing, as investors often perceive auditors from the Big Four as a sign of financial credibility. Furthermore, the percentage of stock offerings moderates the relationships between underwriter reputation, leverage, and auditor reputation with underpricing. This occurs because the volume of shares offered does not necessarily mitigate underpricing risk; instead, investors focus on the value of IPO shares. Signal theory explains that the pricing strategy of stock offerings provides quality signals about the company's long-term performance. However, auditors themselves lack the authority to directly influence underpricing, as their role is limited to financial reporting rather than determining stock prices. Based on these findings, future researchers are encouraged to conduct deeper and more comprehensive studies, considering additional factors that may influence underpricing. For private sector investors, careful evaluation of a company's financial health is essential to minimize potential losses. Meanwhile, the government is advised to create public policies that support investment freedom with improved regulatory frameworks. Lastly, academics should further explore this topic through extensive research, contributing to academic literature and disseminating knowledge about IPO underpricing through publications, conferences, and seminars to enhance the understanding of corporate valuation.

References

Agustine, Ivana. 2020. Analysis of Factors Affecting Stock Underpricing: A Study on Companies Conducting Initial Public Offerings on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2019. Faculty of Economics and Business. Brawijaya University.

Astuti, Diah Kirana. 2021. Determinants of Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2015-2019 Period. Master of Management Study Program. Mercu Buana University.

Basuki, A. T. 2016. Regression Analysis in Economic & Business Research: Equipped with SPSS & EViews Applications. Jakarta: Rajawali Press.

Brigham & Houston. 2018. Fundamentals of Financial Management Edition: 14. Jakarta: Salemba Four.

Damayanti, S., & M., Sudarma. 2007. Factors Influencing Companies to Change Public Accounting Firms. National Symposium on Accounting XI.

Darmadji, T., & Fakhrudin. 2012. Capital Market in Indonesia Question and Answer. Jakarta: Salemba Four.

Fadila, Ardhiani. 2020. IPO Underpricing on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. National Development University.

Ghozali, I. (2016) Application of Multivariete Analysis with IBM SPSS 23 Program. Edition 8. Print VIII. Semarang: Diponegoro University Press.

Ghozali, I., & Ratmono, D. 2017. Multivariate and Econometric Analysis with EViews 10. Diponegoro University Publishing Board.

Herbanu Putro L. 2017. The Effect of Company Age, Company Size, Percentage of Shares Offered, Earning Per Share, and Market Conditions on Stock Underpricing at the Time of Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2012-2015. Yogjakarta State University.

Hoesada, Dr Jan. 2020. Agency Theory. Maya Magazine KSAP.

Islah, Orange Novebrez. 2021. The Effect of Media Coverage on Underpricing Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Stock Exchange. Master of Management Study Program, Faculty of Economics. Andalas University.

Jogiyanto, H. 2017. Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis (Eleventh). Yogyakarta: BPFE.

Cashmere. 2015. Analysis of Financial Statements. Jakarta: Rajawali Press.

Kurniawan, Agung Widhi & Zarah Puspitaningtyas. 2016. Quantitative Research Methods. Yogyakarta: Pandiva Buku.

Larasati N, Kusumaningrat M, Athori A. 2023. The Influence of Company Size, Underwriter Reputation, and Percentage of Stock Offerings on Stock Underpricing as Decision Making to Conduct an IPO on the IDX. Journal of Economic Research of Management and Business: Vol.2(2)

Mahardika, Dyan Fajar. 2021. The effect of financial and non-financial variabels on underpricing. Master of Management Study Program, Faculty of Economics and Business, Airlangga University Surabaya, Indonesia.

Muslimah, Rimmah. 2021. Analysis of the Underpricing Phenomenon in IPOs on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Islamic University of Indonesia.

The ultimate person, Wihandaru Sotya. 2019. Equity Market Timing Approach in IPO and Rights Issue of Companies in Indonesia. Thesis, Master of Science in Economic Sciences. Faculty of Economics. Gadjah Mada University.

Son, Rendy Graciano. 2023. The Effect of Share Offering Percentage, Company Size, Company Age, and Debt to Equity Ratio on Underpricing Thesis, Accounting Program. Faculty of Business. Tangerang: Multimedia Nusantara University.

Revaldy, Fazar. 2023. Analysis of Internal and External Factors Affecting Underpricing Levels at the Time of Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2019-2022 Period. Accounting Study Program, Faculty of Economics and Business. Trisakti University.

Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., Jordan, B. D., Lim, J., & Tan, R. 2011. Fundamentals Of Corporate Finance. United Stated: McGrow Hill.

Saefudin, Tri Gunarsih. 2020. Do External Factors Predict Underpricing Better Than Internal Factors? Initial Public Offering Study on IDX in 2009-2017. Yogyakarta University of Technology.

Samsul, M. 2015. Capital Markets and Portfolio Management, Edition 2. Jakarta: Erlangga

Santoso, Edwin. 2016. Constant Profit From IPO Stocks. Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia.

Sihombing, P.R. 2022. Stata app for beginner statistics. Enthusiastic.

Sugiyanto, S., & Febrianti, F. D. 2021. The Effect of Green Intellectual Capital, Conservaism, Earning Management, to Future and Its Implication on Stock Return. The Indonesian Accounting Review, 11(1), 93.

Sugiyanto, S. 2022. The Effect of The Audit Opinion, Financial Distress, and Good Crporate Governance on Audit Delay. Sustainability: Journal of Management and Accounting Journal, 7(1), 72-82.

Sugiyono. 2017. Educational Research Methods of Quantitative, Qualitative, and R&D Approaches.

Sunariyah. 2011. Introduction to Capital Market Knowledge. Sixth edition. Yogyakarta: UPP STIM YKPM.

Supratikta, H., Maemuna, S. Saga, B., 7 Kartolo. 224. The Innovation of Government Risk Management in Indonesia. Journal of Law and Sustainable Development, 12(5), e3625-e3625.

Tambunan, Andy P. 2007. Assessing the Fair Value of Stocks (Stock Valuation). Jakarta. : PT Elex Media.

Tandelilin, E. 2010. Portfolios and Investments: Theory and Applications. Yogyakarta: Canisius.

Widoatmodjo, Sawiji. 2009. Indonesian Capital Market: Introduction and Case Study. Ghalia Indonesia.

Yuliani. 2019. Analysis of Factors Affecting Levels. Underpricing of shares at the time of Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the stock exchange. Management Study Program, Sriwijaya University.